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T his paper encompasses twomajor themes— local
governance and citizens’ participation in
five neighbouring countries in South Asia,
their trials, achievements and failures.
Whether their experiences can help the
international community in drawing
useful conclusions on these two themes
is what this paper proposes to explore.
Citizen participation is the essence of
democracy. An ordinary local citizen
should feel that he is not just an inert
subject of an arbitrary government far
removed from him, but a person whose
views must be considered since the
government belongs to him and the ruler
exists for his benefit and not the other
way round.  This can be best achieved only
through an elected local government, since
the people are likely to choose the ones
who care for their interests most.  The local
rulers will also have to be sensitive to the
needs of the people, if they wish to get
continued support from them. Citizen
participation and democratic local
governance are thus closely inter-linked
and a discussion on one will necessarily
lead to the other.
Local governments are the visible
instruments of decentralization. A local
government, because of its closeness to a
location, can provide certain services far
more efficiently than a national
government. With its superior local
knowledge it can plan for the social,
economic and manpower betterment,
much better than the central government.
It can ensure better accountability of
public officials to the citizen, because of
its nearness to the people. By virtue of its
position, a local government can be an
effective communication channel between
the centre and the people, thus providing
an institutional mechanism for peoples’
participation even in national governance.
Since local governments readily provide
the channel for participation, the
very purpose of establishing a local
government will get defeated if the citizens
do not participate in it. Hence, in addition
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to examining in detail the decentralized
local governance patterns in these
countries we will, in this paper, look at
citizens’ participation also primarily
through the mirror of local governments.
Governance is a dynamic process and the
circumstances indicated in this paper
might have undergone some changes by
now. The conclusions arrived at in this
paper cannot therefore be exhaustive or
perfect.
The five countries chosen for this study
- Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan
and Sri Lanka (in alphabetical order)
have several similarities and cultural
specificities. In principle they all want to
decentralize (or at least that is what their
ii
Governments swear) and the stated
purpose of decentralization has been to
facilitate citizen participation. Their
processes are different and the experiences
vary. We need to take a quick look at them
before we draw any conclusions or suggest
a way forward. The rest of this paper is
therefore divided into three parts- first, a
summary of the local governance systems
that are now in existence in these South
Asian countries; the second, a quick
assessment and analysis of the systems
and the third, attempting to draw some
conclusions and suggesting a possible
way forward in the context of community
participation.
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Bangladesh
E ver since the birth of the nation in1971 there have been several
attempts by successive governments
to establish local governments in
Bangladesh. The first experiment began
in 1972 with Article 59 of the
Constitution stating that “Local
government in every administrative unit
of the republic shall be entrusted to
bodies composed of persons elected in
accordance with Law.”  To ensure that this
is translated into action, the Constitution
then directed the Parliament to confer
necessary powers on the local
governments including the power to
impose taxes.  Though these provisions
were subsequently abolished by another
Government through an amendment,
they were restored subsequently by a third
Government in 1991. Despite all this,
there is no clause in the Constitution even
now which specifies the number of tiers,
division of functions among the central,
regional and local levels or the financial
arrangements between them.
At present two types of local
government institutions are envisaged in
Bangladesh – a three-tier system for the
rural areas and single-tier for the urban
areas.  The rural local bodies are the Union
Parishad (UP), Upazilla Parishad (UZP)
and the Zilla Parishad (ZP). The urban
local government bodies are the
Paurshavas in cities and small towns and
City Corporations for the metropolitan
cities.  The following Figure 1 shows the
administrative units and the local
government bodies in Bangladesh.
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The UP consists of 12 members
including a chairman, 9 of whom are
elected from each of the 9 wards. Three
seats are reserved for women. According
to the local government UZP Ordinance
2008, UZP consisted of an elected
chairperson; two elected Vice-chairpersons
(one male and one female), chairpersons
of all UPs and mayors of municipalities
if any within the Upazilla and nominated
women members.  According to the Local
Government (ZP) Act, 1988, a ZP
comprised public representatives such as
Members of the Parliament, chairpersons
of UZPs and the Paurshavas in the
district, nominated women members and
a few officials.  The ZPs in the hill districts
consisted of a specific number of tribal
and non-tribal members who are directly
elected by the people.  These Ordinances/
Acts governing the local governments vest
in the national government the authority
to determine or modify the size and
boundaries of the local units and
formulate rules and bye-laws for them.
The government decides not only the
strength of the Council but also the names
and designations of the nominated and
official members. It also decides when to
hold the elections for the LGIs, with the
result that never elections were held on
time for any LGI in Bangladesh.
Under the local government ordinance
1983 several functions have been
assigned to the UPs such as civic
functions, police and defence functions,
revenue and general administrative
functions and development functions.
Although the Ups are made responsible
for 38 functions, most of them remain
only in paper.  In addition, the UPs are
also involved in the implementation of the
government and donor assisted
programmes. The UZPs are entrusted with
an equally impressive list of functions but
the most important is the preparation of
the Upazilla five year plan on the basis of
the plans submitted by the UPs. Several
functions are also expected to be
transferred to the UZPs from different
departments of the national government.
Unfortunately, in reality, most of these
functions were continued to be performed
by the national government as elections
to the UZPs could not take place for over
18 years since 1990. The old system of
Thana Development Coordination
Committee (TDCC) was continued
under the supervision of a civil servant
appointed by the Government. The
main function of TDCC then was
the allocation of funds among the UPs
for development as and when the TDCC
received its annual block of grants
for development from the national
government. Though the elections to
UZPs have been held in 2009, there has
been very little progress so far in their
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discharging the functions assigned to
them under the ordinance.
The ZPs are expected to be responsible
for monitoring the activities of the UZPs.
Though Zilla Parishads Act 2000 has
identified a number of compulsory and
optional functions, in reality the ZPs could
perform only limited functions in the
fields of law and order and coordination
of development activities among the local
government bodies at the lower levels.
Here again, no elections were held at all
to elect ZPs in the country expect only
once and as on date, just the structures
remain, without any elected
representatives at the district level.
The Paurashavas / city corporations
are empowered to discharge a variety of
municipal and civic functions. Since their
financial resources are extremely limited
these institutions could also perform only
minimal functions such as provision of
water supply, registration of births, deaths
and marriages, maintenance of roads,
bridges, culverts, street lights, community
centres etc. (On the other hand, the Local
Government Engineering Department
which was established under the National
Government to provide technical support
to local bodies got expanded hampering
in the bargain capacity development
among the LGIs.) Both the urban and
rural local governments perform the basic
tasks assigned to them through a
committee system dividing the
responsibility among their members.
As a country, Bangladesh lacks
adequate funds to meet the needs of the
people and the same is true for LGIs as
well. There is no budgetary formula for
allocation of resources among the LGIs.
Main sources of their income include
taxes, rates, fees and charges levied by
them; rents and profits accruing from their
properties and sums received through
services. Contribution form individuals
and institutions, government grants,
profits from investments, and loans are
the other sources of income. Urban local
bodies raise between 55-75 per cent of
the revenue from their own sources while
the rest comes through government grants.
Government supervision and control are
very strict regarding the finances of LGIs.
Central Acts prescribe in detail the
sources of income, scales and limits of
taxation, nature of available grants-in-aid
and the loans that can be raised. They
also specify that the funds of LGIs be kept
in a government treasury or a bank
transacting business with the treasury.
On the personnel front, the LGIs
suffer from a lack of adequate and efficient
staff support to carry out their functions.
Personnel management is in the hands
of the Central Government which has
retained the power of appointing key
officials either on transfer, recruitment or
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on deputation. The government has also
retained the powers to quash the
proceedings of the local bodies, suspend
the execution of any resolution or order
made by them and direct the local body
to take specific action. In addition, the
government officials at different level have
also been empowered to take up periodic
inspection of the LGIs. The Law also gives
the national government the extreme
power of dissolving a LGI if deemed fit.
The relationship between the LGIs
and the Non-Government Organizations
(NGOs) has not been formalized in
Bangladesh. Most policy makers view
NGOs with suspicion, ambivalence and
neglect. The NGOs also do not have any
concerted policy to deal with LGIs
although some of them on an individual
basis have worked out a rapport with
selected LGIs. People’s participation in
local governance appears to be limited to
participating in the elections which are
also not held at regular intervals.
India
Village communities common to most
agrarian economies have been in existence
in India for over centuries. They were
called “Panchayats”-council of 5 persons,
one in every village. The autonomy of the
panchayats gradually disappeared owing
to the establishment of local civil and
criminal courts, revenue and police
organizations, the increase in
communication etc. Though an attempt
was made to revive the panchayats at the
time of enacting the Indian Constitution,
it could not materialize. While the Central
and State Governments were established
by the Constitution in 1950, the local
governments could get their
Constitutional status only in 1993,
through the Constitution 73rd and the
74th Amendment Acts, which recognized
the panchayats and the Municipalities as
units of local self-government.
The Gramsabha (i.e. the Village
Council) is the basic unit of the system.
It consists of all persons registered as
voters (i.e. persons above the age of 18
years) of that village. The gramsabha
exercises general supervision over the
gram panchayat (GP) which is the elected
body at the lowest level. As per the
Constitution, States with a population
exceeding two million will have to
constitute an elected three-tier system of
Panchayatiraj Institutions (PRIs) – at the
district (Zilla Panchayat), taluk (Taluk
Panchayat) and village (Gram Panchayat)
levels.  The urban areas will have a single
tier viz. Town Panchayats (for areas in
transition from rural to urban), Municipal
Councils (for small and medium towns)
and City Corporations (for cities).
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Reservation of seats has been provided
at every level for the recognized weaker
sections of the society, usually called
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(SCs/STs) in proportion to their
population in a given Panchayat area and
for women to the extent of not less than
one-third of the total number of seats.
Similarly, offices of the chairpersons in the
Panchayats at each level shall be reserved
for women, to the extent of not less than
one-third of the total number of offices of
chairpersons in the panchayats at each
level, and for the SCs and STs in
proportion to the population of the SCs/
STs in the State as against the total
population of the State.  In addition, the
Legislature of any State can make
provision for reservation of seats in any
panchayat or office of chairpersons in the
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panchayats at any level in favour of the
other backward classes of citizens. The
term of office of Panchayats at every level
shall be for five years and if dissolved
earlier, elections must be completed within
six months from the date of dissolution.
The direction and control of the
preparation of electoral rolls and the
conduct of all elections in the panchayats
shall be vested in the State Election
Commission to be constituted by the State
concerned.
The district panchayat and the
intermediate panchayat do not have any
taxation powers in the Indian system.
Their internal generation of resources is
confined to income earned through
management of natural resources such as
horticulture gardens, fisheries’ tanks etc.,
user fees and rents.  The Gram Panchayats
do have taxation sources such as the
property tax, land tax, etc., but the income
generated through tax collection is largely
insignificant. All the panchayats are
generally dependent on the Central and
State government grants most of which
are assigned to specific schemes. Some
States do provide an untied grant to the
Gram Panchayats only. However, a
finance commission is constituted in every
State once in five years to go into the
principles governing the distribution and
devolution of financial resources between
the State and the Panchayats at every level
and the measures to improve the financial
position of the panchayats. The Central
Finance Commission established under
the Constitution to allocate resources
between the Centre and the States also
provides block grants to the States
specifically for distribution among the
panchayats to meet their local needs.
A key provision of the Constitution
(73rd) Amendment relates to the
assignment of functions and powers to the
PRIs. Since this has to be done without
disturbing the existing federal structure
of the Constitution, the amendment
stipulates that the State legislatures may
endow the PRIs with such powers and
authorities as may be necessary to enable
them to function as institutions of self-
governance. The States may also provide
for devolution of powers and
responsibilities for preparation of plans
and implementation of schemes for
economic development and social justice
on 29 subjects listed in the 11th schedule
of the Constitution. The devolution of
functions and powers to the PRIs hence
varies from State to State depending upon
the commitments and ideologies of the
States concerned. The same is the case
with urban local bodies as well. However
they all have to prepare plans for economic
development and social justice and
implement them within their locality.
Decentralized planning therefore is the
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key function assigned to the LGIs in
India.
The official machinery of the LGI is
always headed by a civil servant deputed
by the State government.  The senior staffs
of the departments which come under the
jurisdiction of the LGI are usually on
deputation from the concerned provincial
government departments to the LGI.
While administratively they are under
the LGIs, technical supervision is by their
parent departments. Thus, they have a
dual loyalty as their career prospects are
always with the line departments, even
though their salaries for the time being
are paid by the LGI they serve.
Nepal
Nepal is a land locked country with
land broken up into tiny pockets
separated from one another by mountain
barriers. These pockets always maintained
some kind of autonomy as the central writ
could not be passed on to them without
much difficulty. Even though village
administration in Nepal is thus as old as
the village itself, statutory recognition for
decentralization came in only through the
Local Self Governance Act, 1999 (LSGA,
1999).  This Act created a two-tier system
of local governance, one at the district
level to be managed by the District
Development Committees (DDCs) and the
other at a lower level to be managed by
the Village Development Committees
(VDCs) for rural areas and Municipalities
for urban areas respectively.  The Act also
envisaged a decentralization monitoring
committee at the national level headed
by the Prime Minister to monitor the
progress in the implementation of the
decentralization process. Other key
features of this Act were the constitution
of local governance finance commission
to recommend suitable financial support
to the local governments; revenue sharing
between the centre and the local bodies;
establishment of local service commission
to recruit staff; reservation of 20 per cent
seats to women and disadvantaged groups
at the local level and a mandate for an
association of local governments to
articulate, represent and defend the
interests of local governments.
Under LSGA 1999, VDCs are the
lowest units of the local government
system in Nepal. Each VDC is divided into
9 wards and each ward has a committee
of 5 elected representatives one of whom
shall be a women.  Each VDC works under
a village council which is a deliberative
body consisting of the Chairperson and
the Deputy Chairperson of the VDC and
ward Committee members along with a
few other nominated members
representing disadvantaged groups. The
municipal areas which are governed by
the municipalities have also been divided
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into wards even though the number of
elected council members varies from
municipality to municipality. As in the
case of VDC, the municipality has also a
council and executive committees.
Likewise, the DDC is divided into
Ilakhas (areas). It has a council consisting
of the Chairperson and the Deputy
Chairperson of each of the VDCs within
the district, Mayor and Deputy Mayor of
each of the Municipalities within the
district, the members of the Constituent
Assembly/Parliament representing the
district and six other persons including
one women nominated by the council
from among the social workers, socially
and economically disadvantaged, ethnic









and indigenous people residing within the
district.
The following diagrams (Figures 3 and
4) sum up the composition of VDCs and
DDCs as per LSGA, 1999.
The national government provides an
assured minimum grant each year to
every local body and supplements it
with additional grants if necessary. The
government also constitutes a finance
commission comprising of representatives
of the concerned federation of local bodies
to study the tax proposals of the local
bodies and the revenue to be distributed
between the government and the local
bodies.  As of now, no equalization scheme
exists between districts to bring about a
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balance between the less affluent and
more affluent districts. The revenues
assigned to the local bodies by the LSGA
include house and land tax, vehicle tax,
business tax and user fees. While VDCs
can levy the natural resource utilization
tax, the DDCs can raise tax on the use of
roads, bridges and canals constructed or
maintained by them. The local bodies,
however, have little flexibility in fixing the
tax rates. In any case, the tax collection
is so nominal as to make the local bodies
entirely dependent on the national
government for finance.
Though the LSGA has devolved a
series of functions to local bodies at the
respective levels, the key functions are
mainly in the areas of education,
agriculture, natural resources
management, irrigation and industries.
However, roles and functions overlap not
only between the national and local
governments but also among local
governments themselves. Though the local
government institutions (LGIs) are
authorized to have their own secretariat
staff, in practice the personnel come under
two broad categories – higher level staff
deputed by the central government and
lower staff recruited by the local
government. The civil servants appointed
by national government are primarily
responsible for the national government
and the chairperson of the DDC virtually
has no official involvement in their
performance evaluation or in other service
matters. The LSGA, 1999 empowers the
government to give directions to the
local bodies. In addition, the national
government also has the power to
suspend, dissolve and extend the tenure
of a local government.
Unfortunately the provisions of LSGA
1999 largely remain on paper in view of
Figure 4: Composition of DDC according to LSGA
District development
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the political instability and the conflicts
that surfaced at the national level
thereafter.  In fact, local elections have not
been held for almost a decade and the 601
member constituent assembly which is
currently in the process of finalizing the
national constitution is expected to
provide adequate attention to local
governance as well.
In the absence of elections, all LGIs
are currently run by government staff with
a chief executive officer appointed by the
national government from among its
bureaucracy.  Representatives of political
parties have been nominated by the
central government to the consultative
groups constituted to aid and advice the
chief executive of the local body concerned.
Though the importance of citizens’
participation in governance is recognized
under various policy documents, no
concrete steps have been taken to
formalize these relationships in the local
government context.  Despite an elaborate
procedure prescribed for participatory
planning process, the line departments
continue to follow their own sectoral
planning processes and the LGIs are
bypassed both at the stage of planning
and in implementation.
As we all know, Nepal is passing
through a phase of political dialogue and
a new federal constitution is underway.
The political parties while contesting the
elections for the constituent assembly
have uniformly supported a federal set up
for Nepal with a strong local government
component even though they have not
clearly articulated the shape of the local
governments and the relationship
between governments at different levels.
We can only hope that the incoming
Constitution will provide for effective local
self-governance at grassroots levels in
Nepal.
Pakistan
Peoples’ participation in the
management of their own affairs is not
new to Pakistan. Historically, villages in
Pakistan have always been governed by
a Punjayati system (Punj is a Punjabi
word for digit 5). However, it was Gen.
Ayub Khan who formally introduced “a
basic democracy plan” in 1959 creating
local councils throughout the country as
a first step to democratize the nation over
a period of time. At the start of the current
millennium, the Military regime in
Pakistan came out with a reform plan for
district governance through Local
Government Ordinances (LGOs). The
purpose of the reform was purportedly
the devolution of political power and
decentralized administrative and financial
authority to LGIs, institutional
arrangement for integrating rural and
urban areas, effective delivery of services
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and decision making through
participation of the people at the
grassroots level. Another feature of these
reforms was the reservation of 1/3 of the
seats for women and also for the other
weaker sections of the population.
The reforms took place with a
remarkable speed starting with the abolition
of the historical post of the district officer
and making the district police chief
accountable to an elected district mayor
(Nazim).  A system of three-tiered LGIs
consisting of (i) Union Councils (common
for both rural and urban areas); (ii) Tehsil
Councils for both rural and small urban
areas or Taluka Councils for towns and (iii)
District Governments for both rural and
urban areas was established with a
provision to elect the members of the union
council directly on the basis of adult
franchise.  Each Union Council had 21
directly elected members including the
Mayor and the Deputy Mayor (Nazim and
naib Nazim) on a joint ticket with a
stipulation that the candidates, at the least,
must be matriculates. 19 more persons were
to be nominated by the concerned
provincial governments providing for
peasants and workers and minorities
including women. Under this system, the
Union Mayor is an ex-officio a member of
the district council and the union Deputy
Mayor, an ex-officio member of the tehsil/
taluk council. The union councilors elect the
district or tehsil (or taluka in urban districts)
councilors, who in turn elect the district and
tehsil (or taluka) mayor and deputy mayor
on a joint ticket, none of whom can be union
councilors. The district and tehsil (or taluka)
councils are made up of about two-thirds
indirectly elected and one-third nominated
members. Each tier of local governance has
a four year term, with a two-term limit for
mayors and deputy mayors at all levels of
government.
Figure 5 below depicts the local




Tehsil Council (Rural / Semi urban) Taluk Council (Town)
Union Council (Rural) Union Council (Urban)
Figure 5:
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The most significant reform of this
decentralized governance introduced by
a military government in Pakistan is the
abolition of the deputy commissioner
(DC) at the district level and distributing
his powers to a District Co-ordination
Officer (DCO) assisted by a team of
Executive District Officers (EDOs), all of
whom are directly answerable to the
District Mayor. Though this system
promises substantial autonomy for elected
local officials and places an elected official
as the head of the district administration
reversing the century old system that
subordinated elected politicians to the
bureaucrats, in practice the control of the
central government over the local
governments continued. The national
government retained the power to appoint
and remove the DCO without consulting
the Nazim. The DCOs and EDOs were
employees of either federal or provincial
governments. They are answerable to
their own bosses in the line departments
who have control over their transfers and
postings. There was no proposal to
constitute district cadres to manage the
affairs of the LGIs.
The district government no doubt
has greater budgeting, planning and
development functions, but the
devolution plan confined itself to the
decentralization of powers and functions
from the provinces to the local levels and
did not decentralize any federal powers
and functions to the lower levels. The
LGOs created a functional separation of
delivery functions across different tiers of
provincial and local governments, but
control over personnel which has
important consequences for bureaucratic
accountability was retained by the
province. Though the district police chief
was made responsible to the elected mayor
and safety commissions were proposed to
monitor police performance and redress
public grievances, the police continued to
be highly politicized in Pakistan and
despite provisions for police autonomy on
assignments, they remained centrally or
provincially controlled.
Pakistan has a highly centralized fiscal
system with the federal government
raising around 90 per cent of tax revenues.
Provincial governments rely
overwhelmingly on federal transfers,
which are about 80 per cent of their
revenues. Under the proposed Local
Government Plan, LGIs would receive
revenue through formula-based provincial
transfers and the decentralization of
specified taxation powers. While the plan
remained vague on the exact modalities
of fiscal decentralization, it proposed a
provincial finance commission for the
transfers envisaged to the district and
tehsil levels. The process of allocating
funds continued to be non-transparent
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and inequitable and the fiscal limitations
on LGIs persisted. There has not been a
significant increase in the devolution of
financial powers. Another cause of concern
is the continuing inability of the district
governments to increase local sources of
revenue.
A notable feature of the reforms was
the conscious effort to involve local
citizens in the process of development.
Acknowledging the importance of civil
society in development and service
delivery, citizen’s community boards
(CCBs) and village and neighbourhood
committees were proposed under the
LGO.  A CCB is a non elected voluntary
organization.  At least 25 per cent of the
total development budget of each tier of
local governance must be earmarked for
projects identified by CCBs and each CCB
has to make a contribution of 20 per cent
in cash to tap these funds for a specific
project.  The concept is no doubt laudable;
but, unfortunately only few CCBs could
be formed at the local levels and it is
generally alleged that the district mayor
and the line department officials
consciously avoided the formation of
CCBs as they are more interested in
utilizing the funds through elected
representatives.
Under the LGO, monitoring and
accountability are part of the local
government system. The District Council
has to monitor district administration
through a system of committees. Elected
monitoring committees are responsible for
reporting administrative malpractice and
corruption in LGIs to the district mayor
for appropriate action. Unfortunately these
committees exist mostly on paper. There
are no rules of business or financial
provisions for their functioning.
Despite all the shortcomings, the
roadmap of local governance reforms
suggested in the LGO was bold and path
breaking. Its vulnerability however was
in the lack of wider public participation
in design and implementation. That
perhaps explains the decision of the
elected government that came to power
in Pakistan following her return to
democracy, to review the entire system of
local governance introduced by the
military regime though the elections were
due in 2009. The National Government
has also directed the Provincial
Governments to prepare their own plans
for decentralization and only one out of
the four Provinces has so far completed
this task. As of now, all the LGIs that came
into existence through the LGOs remain
in position, but without the elected
representatives. They are for the time being
managed by civil servants, appointed
by the higher level governments, who
will hopefully give way to elected
representatives as and when a final
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF ADVANCED STUDIES
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decision is taken on the local government
structure, by the present government.
Sri Lanka
Historically the governance frame
work in Sri Lanka had only two tiers i.e.
National government and the local
governments characterized by Municipal,
Urban and Town Councils and Gam
Sabhas or the Village Councils. At the top
of the local government system were the
Municipal Councils constituted for cities
and large towns, while Urban Councils
were created for other urbanized areas.
There were similarities between these two
types of institutions. Similarly Village
Councils were meant to cater to the rural
people, while small towns came under the
administration of the Town Councils. The
constitution, powers and function of these
four types of local government institutions
were determined by the respective
ordinances passed by the State Council.
Elections to the LGIs were based on
a simple mechanism. All council areas
were divided into a number of wards and
representatives from these wards were
elected through the first – past – the post
system until the system got changed into
a proportional representation system after
1978. The functions of the councils
included health and sanitation,
construction and maintenance of local
roads, housing, public markets, parks,
libraries and other utilities. The main
powers of the councils were the collection
of taxes, issuing licenses for shops and
petty businesses and standard setting
and regulation of those standards in the
functions of the councils.
Ceylon, as Sri Lanka was called at the
time of independence in 1948, had a
unitary state system. The local
governments came directly under the
central government (without any
provincial or state government in between)
although the elections were held
independently. A separate local
government service (LGS) was created to
recruit personnel for local government
institutions, which however was directly
responsible to the Minister of Local
Government in the central government.
The discipline and transfer of the
personnel came under LGS, which left
little power to the LGIs on these matters.
The LGIs particularly in rural areas
could not generate much income on their
own. Their activities and services were
largely dependent on national budget
allocations and grants. This had direct
consequences on the local government
institutions in the North and East,
traditionally inhabited by the Tamils and
the Muslims. There were over hundred
LGIs in these areas and they were the
only institutions that the minority
communities could directly control to
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achieve whatever possible under the
circumstances. There was the problem of
distances in the first place. While the
LGIs had to rely largely on the Ministry
in Colombo for financial and
administrative matters, communication
with or travel to Colombo was extremely
frustrating. Then there were the issues of
ethnicity and politics. Language was a
major issue in communication since the
mid 1950s, and a genuine difficulty
between the Ministry officials and the
visiting local councilors and officers. There
were feelings of discrimination, actual and
perceived. The control of local councils
from Colombo was not only detrimental
to the country’s ethnic relations but also
to good governance in general.
Sri Lanka introduced a presidential
system of government in 1977 and a new
constitution the year after. With the new
constitution, the electoral system was
changed into proportional representation
which did not make much sense at local
levels. Under this system the Districts
secretaries conducted elections in their
capacity as Election Officers in the
districts. Their duties were limited to the
preparation and certification of electoral
registers and the conduct of the poll.
Under this system, the Commissioner of
Elections gazettes the list of candidates
and gives all necessary directions to the
Election Officers on the conduct of the
poll. The Commissioner of Election also
decides the number of seats each party
will get based on the votes obtained. The
term of office of the members in a LGI is
four years. There is no limitation of terms
either by law or by any political party
regulations.
In another development, all local
government elections were postponed
after 1977 and no election for any council
was held until 1981 when a new system
of District Councils was introduced in
place of Village Councils and Town
Councils to address some of the demands
of the Tamil community for greater
power/participation in development
administration at district level. This
however came to be abandoned within six
years.
A  positive change took place in the
form of the Pradeshiya Sabha Act (PSA)
of 1987 whereby a new local government
system predominantly for rural areas
came to be introduced amalgamating in
many places the old Village Council areas
and the Town Council areas. The major
constitutional reform that affected the
local government system however came
at the end of the same year (1987) with
the 13th Amendment to the Constitution
which introduced a new layer of
governance at the provincial level called
the Provincial Councils (PCs). The
introduction of PCs was meant to
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ameliorate the demands particularly of
the Tamil community who sought a
separate state or tangible autonomy for
the provinces of the North/East of Sri
Lanka. The PC which fell far short of
federalism nevertheless introduced a
semblance of devolution of power. Under
this scheme of devolution, the local
governments came under the control and
supervision of the PCs.
The introduction of the PC system was
a sudden change and the people, the
councilors or the officials did not
understand where they stood under the
new system for many years to come. Most
affected were the Pradeshiya Sabhas
which cater to the vast majority of the
population. The PC system also has not
been politically stable. It was not a
success in the North or the East because
of its rejection by the separatist
movement. There has always been a
speculation that the system might get
abandoned anytime. The lack of financial
autonomy or stability of the PCs also had
its impact on the system.
Figure 6 below sums up the local
government structure now envisaged in
Sri Lanka.
 While the traditional functions of the
local government as recognized in Sri
Lanka are those relating to public health,
roads and public utility services,
Pradeshiya sabhas were given certain
additional development functions such as
community development projects, women
development activities, employment
programmes, integrated development
schemes of villages, etc. However, these
objectives could not be fully realized since
the Transfer of Powers (Divisional
Secretaries) Act No. 58 of 1992, placed
the emphasis once again on
administrative agencies rather than on the
LGIs. In accordance with the provisions
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rather than the elected Pradeshiya Sabha,
became the focal point of administration.
It is through the Divisional Secretariat
that central government activities are
carried out, with provision being made for
PCs too to function through this
institution.
The local authority legislations in Sri
Lanka provide for the creation of a
Municipal Fund, a Local Fund and a
Pradeshiya Sabha Fund for the respective
LGIs. Although the wordings may differ
generally the following sources constitute
the base of these funds:
All rates, taxes, duties, fee and other
charges levied by the ouncil/sabha
All fines and penalties
Stamp duties and fees
Sums realized by sales, leases or other
transactions
All revenues derived from
propertiesvested in the LGIs or by the
administ ration of any public service
and
All grants and subsidies allocated by
the Government
Though the sources indicated are
impressive, in actual p oractice, most of
the LGIs depend on government grants
for undertaking any development work.
Peoples’ participation in local
governance was at a high level in Sri
Lanka until 1981 when the Village
Councils were in existence. With the
introduction of District Development
Councils in 1981 replacing the Village and
Town Councils, the alienation began. The
system of proportional representation in
LGIs made the elected representatives
strangers to their own constituents. With
machines taking the place of humans in
most development activities, absence of
active participation of the people has
become a regular feature in Sri Lanka
today. There has been no reservation of
seats or positions for women or the weaker
sections in any of the governance
structures in Sri Lanka. Even though
substantial number of women are well
educated and decently employed, their
share in governance remains insignificant.
Though the local government system
in Sri Lanka has been well established
over a long period of time, the LGIs are
to a large extent dependent on and
influenced by the PCs and the central
government through cadres, finance and
legal provisions empowering them to take
action against LGIs. Though attempts are
of late being made to strengthen local
administration, they are yet to bear fruit.
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T o facilitate easy understandingand discussion, let us now set
some ground rules.  From now on in this
paper, the term village panchayat will in-
clude the VDCs of Nepal, UPs and UCs of
Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively and
Pradeshiya Sabhas of Sri Lanka.  The
term Provincial Government will include
2.  AN ANALYSIS
the State Governments in India, the PCs
of Sri Lanka and all such Governments
established just below the national level
in different countries.  The terms Central
Government and National Government
are synonymous. We will now analyze the
patterns we saw in these five countries.
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A mong the five countries we arelooking at, four are now in a
state of transition as far as local
governance is concerned. While Nepal is
in the process of framing a new
constitution for the nation as a whole,
which will determine the future course of
local governance as well, Pakistan,
following her return to democracy, is
reviewing the decentralization set up
established by the erstwhile military
rulers. In Sri Lanka, the thirty year old
armed conflict in the north/east has just
ended and the State itself is in the process
of reconstruction. Though Bangladesh
appears better off, her decentralization
structure is in doldrums. While the MPs
are opposing the establishment of ZPs
tooth and nail as they fear that it would
take away their powers and patronage,
the elected leaders at Upazilla levels are
unhappy with the veto powers given to
the MPs under the Act, which has made
their advice binding on the UZPs. The
only clarity that is available on the
horizon in these four countries is that the
LGIs at the lowest level – the ones closer
to the people – do not appear to be in
danger of extinction. What is not clear,
however, is the degree of empowerment –
whether they will acquire the necessary
powers, finances and the human beings
to discharge the functions that
legitimately belong to them.
Elected local governments are in
position through out India. The structure
is well set even though many States have
started questioning the need for a three-
tier system of elected rural local bodies.
While some States like Kerala would like
to dispense with the intermediate tier,
Tamilnadu would prefer not to have a
district tier at all. Some experts also raise
a basic question as to why should a multi-
tier system be prescribed for rural
governance in countries which always
have a single tier of governance in urban
areas.
The institutional design for
decentralization should take into account
not only the developmental thrusts built
upon the capabilities at the local levels
but also the need to ensure local
participation in decision-making. The
3. STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS
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dynamics of development in our countries
necessitates that the technical expertise
of a high order be made available at levels
below the Province to sustain the
momentum of development which, in
many cases, has been already
administratively decentralized at the
district level. The inescapable conclusion,
therefore, is that the district should be the
first point of decentralization, under
popular supervision, below the provincial
level.
The problem of striking a balance
between technological requirements
and possibilities for meaningful
participation by the people in
development management recurs at levels
below the district. Since it is extremely
difficult, in many countries, to combine
representativeness and viability in one
level of local government, this problem is
sought to be solved by having two or more
tiers in such a way that the smaller-area
one is closer to the people while the larger-
area one is better financed and technically
more powerful.
The question of adequate area for
a unit of administration is quite
complicated in any given country, owing
to unevenness in terms of economic
resources, communication facilities,
population density, level of social
integration, civic commitment, etc. A
uniform set of criteria cannot apply, even
within a single country. It would, therefore,
seem appropriate to leave the exact
pattern of local government below
the district level to the Provinces. The
Central/Federal Government could at best
lay down the general criteria for guidance.
More recently two criteria have been
suggested for determining the size of a
local government unit. These are access
and service. If service is taken as the prime
determinant of size, an important
consideration has to be the population,
because the cost of the service is a function
of the population requiring that service,
although at some point, when the
population reaches a certain level, the unit
cost of the service would reduce. It means,
therefore, a minimum and a maximum
population can be established — a
minimum to guarantee that the service is
not too expensive and consequently
inaccessible to the people and a
maximum to ensure quality and
promptness in service.
Access to government in terms of
influencing public policy decisions and
enhancing both responsible and
responsive administration is a prime
requirement for any democratic
government. If access is an important
prerequisite of size, then, in addition to
population, one has to look at the
communication network, level of political
awareness, and also the area. While the
DECENTRALIZED LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN SOUTH ASIA
21
service criteria will take care of the
economic viability and administrative
efficiency, the access criteria should serve
the political and democratic needs of the
people. Should the application of these
criteria lead to divergent views, one has
to raise the basic query, whether the
functions of local government can be or
should be performed for profit.
Insisting on viability for local
government and not for other levels of
government would amount to an obvious
discrimination against local government
since the local government provides an
instrument for democracy or at least
provides an extra avenue for democratic
participation The “access” criteria should,
in my view precede the “service” criteria
in determining the structure of LGIs in
any country.
It must, however, be added that the
lowest tier should not be so small in size
as to make it insignificant or incapable
of discharging its legitimate duties as a
local government. For instance, the Village
Panchayats in most parts of India,
covering a population of about 2,500
cannot perform any functions on their own
and hence do not command the respect a
local government deserves. The Mandal
Praja Parishads in Andhra Pradesh, with
a population of about 40,000 and the
Gram Panchayats in Kerala with a
population of around 30,000, appear to
satisfy both the access and service criteria
and have the potential of becoming the
growth centres which can discharge the
duties of a local government, closer to the
people, fairly effectively. If the lowest tier
can satisfactorily meet the criteria of
access and service, there may not be any
need for an intermediate tier at all between
the district and the village. If the physical
distance between the district head
quarters and the panchayat is substantial,
establishment of de-concentrated offices
of the district government under public
supervision at convenient locations can
bridge this gap and bring the district
government nearer to the people.
There is no alternative to holding
direct elections for the lowest tier. While
it is desirable to have reservations
prescribed for women and weaker
sections, some countries in this region
have opted for nominations, possibly as
an interim measure, to ensure
inclusiveness. While India has preferred
direct elections to constitute all the tiers,
Pakistan and Bangladesh have prescribed
indirect elections for the constitution of
the higher tiers. Considering the increasing
costs of elections and the need to have
linkages between different tiers, it may not
be a bad idea to prescribe direct elections
for the lowest tier and an indirect system
for the other tiers, wherever they are
located, with appropriate reservations.
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Experience in Sri Lanka shows that for
direct elections to LGIs the first-past-the
post system is desirable as against
proportional representation.
Should there be an educational
qualification prescribed for election as a
Local Government Councilor? He has to
be at least a matriculate in Pakistan.
Whether such a stipulation would stand
the test of law in a democracy whose
Constitution guarantees the right of
equality among its citizens is doubtful.
That apart, whether formal education
should be a pre-condition to hold any
public elective office is by itself a
debatable point. There are a number of
instances where totally uneducated Chief
Ministers have distinguished themselves
as competent administrators in several
democracies.
Pakistan has a curious provision
restricting the term of office of the Nazim
and the Naib Nazim to two (i.e. 8 years).
Such a provision is worth emulating to
break the possible hold of vested interests
in the LGIs as well as to encourage local
government councilors taking up higher
responsibilities thereafter.
At this stage it is perhaps necessary
to look at whether mere constitution of
local government institutions at
appropriate levels, holding of regular
elections and even providing
representation to women and weaker
sections would by themselves mean, or
at least lead to, effective “participation”
by the people. What have we seen in these
countries? We saw the concept of “power
to the people” degenerating into “power
to the powerful” in some of them; elected
representatives not bothering to meet
their electorate even once during their term
of office and still getting re-elected on the
strength of their party label and a
substantial portion of the constituency
not turning up to exercise their franchise
out of sheer disgust on the polling day.
In these circumstances, how can people’s
participation be ensured through LGIs?
LGIs are often criticized for helping the
dominant caste/group in the society to
further consolidate their hold over the
non-dominant and minority groups. In a
society where control of land leads to
control of levers of power (which is largely
true in Pakistan and India) will not the
LGIs be more accessible to the upper
strata of the society’?  How do we make
‘community participation’ inclusive?
How do we ensure accountability of the
elected representative to the electorate?
One possible step could be to create
appropriate mechanisms that would
compel an elected representative to face
his constituency periodically and explain
to them what he had done and what he
proposes to do. It is in this context that
the Gram Sabha (or the village council)
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assumes importance. It should be made
obligatory that the chairman and the
members of the Village Panchayat report
their work periodically to the council —
as is the case in India.The council must
consist of the entire electorate in the
village (or at least one representative from
each household, in case the village is quite
big) and shall meet at least twice a year.
This council will be the institutional
forum for social audit at the lowest level.
Problems involving the interests of the
village shall be submitted by the Village
Panchayat to the council for decision after
discussion. It may be of interest to
mention here that in some north-eastern
States in India, the village council is
vested with the power to dismiss
members of the Village Panchayat and
elect new members in their places. Armed
with such a power the village councils can
ensure accountability of the elected
representative besides making people’s
participation meaningful.
A closely related question is whether
there should be separate urban and rural
LGIs as in India or a composite district
government as in Pakistan. The rationale
for parallel systems of urban and rural
local self-governments could be that the
character of the two communities being
different, the problems to be managed by
these LGIs are altogether different. The
rural areas depend on primary production
activities whereas the urban areas thrive
on secondary and tertiary activities. The
land and resource use issues are entirely
different and hence it would be desirable
to let each system concentrate on issues
specific to the character of the
communities they serve. Another
argument could be that the fusion of these
two types of governments might put rural
areas to disadvantage. The low level of
education, lack of experience in public
affairs, inability to control the mass media,
the bureaucratic biases, the difficulties in
the way of organization and mobilization
of public support scattered in thousands
of small village communities and the
capabilities of urban representatives to
push through large projects with an
urban bias may work against the interests
of the rural sector. Parallel systems would
insulate and protect rural interests against
urban influences. The urban areas, being
the main contributors of resources for
public investment, might feel a similar
threat of being overwhelmed by resource-
hungry poor majorities from rural areas.
The costs of parallel forms of local
government are, however, equally heavy.
They have produced artificial resource
constraints. Even though urban
populations’ need for water, land, energy
and nutrients is increasing, it has not been
able to develop these resources for more
equitable sharing simply because these
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resources are usually located outside their
jurisdiction. Nor have the rural areas been
able to develop them because of severe
financial constraints. Using their control
on State power and money power, the
urban areas offer attractive prices and
facilities for increasing the rate of resource
exploitation without incurring the cost of
resource replenishment. Over a period of
time, the cumulative result of the process
of over-exploitation has been the
impoverishment of environment from
where rural areas could get life supports
— free fuel, fodder, fruits, timber, renewal
of soil nutrients, unpolluted water, etc. The
urban local governments have been
reluctant to expand services like water
supply, electricity, roads and transport,
sewerage, etc., to neighbouring villages
because the revenue income from the
villages is too small to pay for even a
fraction of such services. On the other
hand, the land scarcity in urban areas has
given rise to the problems of proliferation
of slum population in unplanned
settlements with severe deficiencies in
basic civic amenities, forcing the
inhabitants to live in dangerously
polluted environments and dilapidated
structures.
The administrative costs of a dual
form of local government are also high.
Municipal revenue of small and medium
towns is so pitiable that most of them
have not been able to meet even the basic
needs of their citizens. On the other hand,
the existing rural local government has
staff resources which, with marginal
adjustments, could be used to look after
the municipal needs of their headquarters
town which can be developed as the
growth centre for both the urban and
rural communities.
The case for ending the dualism in
local government is thus strong. A single
local government at the district level can
perhaps look after the needs of its urban
and rural components with a set of
safeguards built into it so as to ensure
just development of the entire area. In
the South Asian context, a population
of one million may be a suitable cut-
off; however, exceptions may have to be
made in respect of larger-size urban
settlements, keeping in view their social
and economic settings such as the
community identities and the
hinterland served by the city. Such a
district government can also plan for the
entire district obviating the need to
have a separate planning body to
coordinate action by various
implementing agencies at the district
level, including the ZPs and city/town
municipalities.
Figure 7 illustrates an ideal structure
for local governance in South Asian
countries.
















It is sometimes argued that since the
process of decentralization is essentially
meant for promoting the welfare of the
people through community participation,
not only the different tiers of the structure
should have specific responsibilities with
reference to development but the higher
tier should also own the responsibility of
ensuring that the lower tiers do function
with a sense of responsibility. For instance,
if the Village Panchayat passes a
resolution which is unjust, unlawful or
improper, there has to be a forum for the
aggrieved citizen to get justice. Most of
the existing Local Governance Acts do
give such a power, not to an elected body
but to a senior bureaucrat of the Provincial
Government, usually the District Collector
(called the DC). Whether the power to
suspend the execution of a resolution or
order and/or direct the performance of a
particular function by the lower tiers in
the decentralized set-up be given to any
authority in the first place and, if so,
should such an authority be vested in the
next higher tier or given to an independent
judicial/administrative body is a
debatable point.
Possibility of misuse cannot be an
argument against the provision itself. No
doubt suspensions and dissolutions
should not be resorted to, unless in a grave
emergency. But, the absence of a provision
will prevent action even in a genuine case.
The possible safeguards one can suggest
against any misuse could be: (a) to vest
the power of suspension in the next higher
tier (and not delegating it to the
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chairperson or to a standing committee
or to a senior bureaucrat); (b) to insist on
a prescribed procedure which can assure
natural justice; and (c) to hold elections
in respect of the dissolved body within
six months from the date of its
dissolution, as the people are the ultimate
judges whose verdict should be final.
The question whether members of the
State Legislature/Provincial Councils/
Parliament (MLAs/MLCs/MPs) should
be made ex-officio members of the LGIs
is often debated not only in India and
Bangladesh but also in other countries.
Involving MIAs/MLCs/MPs in the
district-level local bodies for the time
being appears inevitable. Firstly, even
though in theory, Parliament, Provincial
Assembly and ZP may be independent
political entities with a well-defined
set of powers and functions, one has
to bear in mind the basic fact that all
these institutions are to perform
complementary roles to each other in the
process of development. The question of
locating a secondary school or a primary
health clinic is a matter of interest not
only to the members of the LGI but also
to the members of the higher level
organs. In a decentralized system of
planning, the lower tier assumes as much
importance as the higher ones and they
should not obviously work at cross
purposes. The presence of MLAs/MLCs/
MPs in the LGI would help in the
planning process and possibly in better
fund allocation. The other argument is
political. Admittedly, most of the MLAs/
MLCs/MPs who are already in positions
of power would not like to part with their
clout in favour of a new breed of public
men who would be elected to various
LGIs. If the nascent local bodies are to
survive the onslaught of influential local-
level politicians, the best way would be
to keep the MLAs/MLCs/MPs inside the
system rather than facing them from
outside, at least until the system takes
root. As an interim measure, perhaps, the
MLAs/MLCs/MPs may have to be
associated with the highest tier below the
Province as full-fledged members, but
not with any veto powers, as in
Bangladesh.
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L GIs have been entrusted with alarge number of functions relating
to civic and community welfare through
different laws in each of these countries.
But the sad fact is that most of them
remain only in paper. There is very little
clarity either at the national level or at
levels below in these countries as to what
functions should be legitimately assigned
to the LGIs?
Let us accept that the functions
devolved upon the LGIs being highly
location specific, exhaustive lists of
functions, for any country, will not have
much of an operational relevance. Local
priorities in all development programmes
vary from region to region, even within a
country, and it is, therefore, necessary that
the individual Provinces have adequate
scope for evolving their own list of
functional priorities. It is in this context
that an irreducible minimum set of
functions need to be assigned to the
district government and the level(s) below,
leaving open any periodic adjustments
that may become necessary in the
dynamic process of development, to suit
the changing requirements.
There can be two ways of identifying
such functions. One is the principle
adopted by Pakistan in its local
government reforms, namely, to locate the
functions which require detailed local
knowledge for efficient performance; in
which success depends on community
responsiveness and participation; which
are of a personal nature requiring
provision, close to where the affected
individuals live and in which significant
use of discretion or understanding of
individuals is needed, provided such
services can be efficiently rendered on the
scale of a local government area. On this
basis, one set of functions can be listed
as items which are the exclusive
responsibility of the LGIs save in
exceptional or temporary circumstances.
Alongside this list, another set of
functions can also be enumerated as local
government responsibilities, although the
Provincial Governments and other
organizations may also perform part or
whole of these functions if the LGIs are
not equipped to perform them initially.
Prominent among the first list are
provision and management of public
4.  POWERS AND FUNCTIONS
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conveniences, slaughter houses, grazing
grounds, etc., most of which can be
grouped under “provisions of local
services”, and collection of local taxes. The
second list includes the key subjects of
health, education, agriculture, water
supply, sewerage, etc. The general theme
of distribution is to hand over to the LGIs
such functions which they need to
discharge and leave the rest flexible.
The other method is the Gandhian
principle of Swaraj or what is called
in modern management jargon
“management by exception”. This implies
what the village or Village Panchayat can
do for itself should not be done by the
authority at a higher level. What the ZP
can do for its area should not be burdened
on the Provincial Government. Likewise,
what the State Governments can do,
with regard to their constitutional
responsibilities, should not be loaded on
the Central Government. In this system
of rationalization, every unit from the
smallest to the largest is made to do the
maximum it can, without unnecessary
dependence on an outside authority. The
question, therefore, is to identify the
maximum set of functions which can be
suitably and efficiently managed by the
LGIs, leave it to them entirely and
distribute the resources accordingly. This
method would be more in tune with the
concept of democratic decentralization as,
in a democracy, the people are sovereign
and therefore, distribution of power
should be from the base upwards. That is
to say, the Village Panchayat should first
determine what powers it should keep for
itself for the purpose of administration
and development of the village and the
residuary powers only will be delegated
to the other levels. The district and
Provincial Governments should also
decide likewise.
Though in theory the latter principle
should be ideal, in practice it could
become extremely difficult to achieve, at
least until the local government system
takes root and grows into a position of
strength from where it can demand its
rightful share. Until then, the allocation
of functions has to be on the basis of local
conditions and mutual negotiations.
Anyway there is an agreement, by and
large, in most parts of South Asia that
proper management of resources like land,
water, forests, grazing grounds for the
animals, etc., require local-level planning.
These will, therefore, have to be brought
under the local government set-up. Second
important function relates to efficient land
use programmes, so that the needs of food,
fodder and fuel can be met locally as far
as possible. Third function could be the
provision of basic minimum needs such
as primary education, adult literacy,
primary health care including child health
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and family planning, drinking water, rural
roads and efficient functioning of public
distribution system.
One more function relates to the
village industry and anti-poverty
programmes, both of which need an
intimate local knowledge to be successful.
Though the local governments in these
systems may not themselves take on the
task of running village and small
industries, they can at least encourage the
growth of these industries, by creating the
necessary infrastructure and environment.
The district government will have to have
its own set of regulatory functions also
such as maintenance of land records,
registration of birth, death and marriages,
collection of local taxes, etc., which has
an impact on local administration and
development.
Since the beginning of this century,
all the police commissions/committees
set up in this region have accepted the
impossibility of carrying on an efficient
rural policing system by means of official
policemen and have stressed the need to
secure the aid of the village community
in that endeavour. If that be so, why not
make use of the Panchayats which
represent the local people? In most of
the developed countries, policing is a
municipal job and there is no reason
why it should not be so in South Asia as
well.
In a district government set-up, it will
not be possible to compartmentalize
“regulatory” and “development” functions,
as each has repercussions on the other.
For instance, a successful implementation
of land reforms would ensure that the
LGIs are not dominated by big land
owners, as was shown in the Indian State
of West Bengal. Sometimes a minor
irrigation project may require the
acquisition of land from the people and
their consequent rehabilitation. It would,
therefore. be necessary, to have the
regulatory land revenue function very
much within the ambit of a local
government;  so will be the case with the
distribution of essential commodities,
organization of regulated markets for
commodities, etc. However, the emphasis
should be on LGIs being meaningful
agents of development and they must,
therefore, play a key role in the fields of
agriculture, rural development and
diversification of the rural economy by
adopting an effective process of
decentralized planning.
Identifying functions that should
be assigned to LGIs is one thing and
getting them devolved on the LGIs is
another.   The latter is much more difficult
as the politicians at the higher levels of
governance and the entrenched
bureaucracy will stoutly oppose such a
move. Converting democratic
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decentralization into a people’s
programme and generating public
demand can only create the necessary
environment and political will to get this
done.
The process of decentralization cannot
be static. Many of the schemes and
functions allocated to a particular tier at
one point of time may have to be
transferred to another tier for better
performance at a different point of time.
Disputes can arise in the performance of
certain functions either within the local
government structure or between the local
and Provincial/Central Governments. All
the local government reforms commissions
set up by different regimes in Bangladesh
have in fact recommended the
establishment of an independent
commission to oversee inter-governmental
relationships with particular reference to
functions, functionaries and finance. Such
safeguards appear necessary, at least
during the initial years of any local
government experiment.
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L ack of adequate resources has beenthe bane of LGIs in this region.
On the financial side, the LGIs are left
with only four types of resources in the
form of: (a) local taxes (b) user fees (c)
subsidies and grants from higher level
governments, and (d) loans.Local taxes
are difficult to realize. User fees are
negligible.Loans will not be easily
available as they may require a
Government Guarantee and cannot be
repaid in time, as they may not always
get linked to a productive asset. Thus most
LGIs are dependent on the largesse of the
higher level governments. Whatever may
be the difficulties in mobilization, local
governments have a duty to generate their
own local resources, for at least three
important reasons. Firstly, it gives them
a sense of autonomy and also financial
responsibility. Secondly it gives the local
people a sense of participation through
their own resources in the process of
development at the local level. Thirdly, it
changes the equation between the local
and state governments – from that of a
beneficiary-donor relationship to the
level of at least unequal partners in
development. However, there is a
justification for federal-provincial
financial assistance to LGIs. Some
taxes involve economies of scale in
administration. Such taxes will have to
go to the Central or Provincial
Government. Others which have only a
local base and which require local
knowledge for administration come to the
local governments. But such taxes tend
to yield less revenue than the taxes which
have a nation or province-wise reach,
thereby a situation would invariably arise
where the LGIs are left with inadequate
revenues to meet local needs.
Consequently, financial transfers from the
higher-level governments to LGIs become
inevitable in any system of governance.
Constitution of independent Finance
Commissions at the Central and
Provincial levels to allocate funds between
different levels of governments is an
accepted policy in India and Nepal. This
could be usefully adopted by the other
5. FINANCIAL AND
HUMAN RESOURCES
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countries also to ensure financial
independence of LGIs in the region. To
ensure that the releases are not left
entirely to the mercy of the Provincial
Government, two safeguards have been
provided in the Indian system. Firstly,
funds are allocated to the ZPs, on the
basis of demands voted by the State
Legislature. Each department while
presenting its budget before the State
Assembly, separately indicates the district
schemes which are to be implemented by
the ZPs in a link document and gets
approval for the release of necessary
funds.  Secondly, the releases are not made
by individual departments to the ZPs but
by the State Finance Department once a
month, taking into consideration the
voted demands and the budgets of the
ZPs concerned. The important point,
however, is that the allocation of funds
from the central and State Government
is on the basis of a formula through which
the plan funds are allocated and not on
the basis of any fixed percentage of the
internally generated revenue of the
respective government. This perhaps is
the best possible method to reduce
dependence of the LGIs on the higher
level governments for funds.
The pattern of human resources
deployment in the LGIs is almost similar
in all these countries. While the higher
level staffs are generally deputed by the
national and/or provincial governments,
the lower staff are usually recruited by the
LGIs. This was perhaps inevitable as in
all these countries decentralization has
been a top-down process initiated long
after the establishment of central/
provincial governments. Officials
belonging to the higher level governments
who were looking after the duties that got
assigned to the LGIs subsequently could
not be discontinued, from the points of
view of economy, experience and
continuity. The easiest thing the national
government could do then was to depute
them to the LGI concerned without
altering their service conditions, as that
would entail unnecessary litigations and
labour disputes.
While this can be justified at the time
of commencement of the local government
system it cannot continue for ever. The
most appropriate course would be to stop
fresh recruitment for such jobs at the
central/provincial level and let the LGIs
take up that responsibility as and when
the need arises either by retirement or
death of incumbent over a period of
time.  Entrusting the responsibility of
recruitment at least for the higher
positions in the LGIs to the local
government service commissions (LGSCs)
is a better option. Instead of letting each
LGI have its own cadre and recruitment
rules, a common code can be evolved
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through consensus for every Province on
the basis of which recruitments, transfers,
promotions and penalties can be made
by the LGSC. Such a move will also
insulate the official machinery from a
possible political interference in their day
to day management.
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T o start with, the countrieswe looked at had faced a
dilemma on the issue of decentralization–
whether it should be devolution or
deconcentration. After an initial
hesitation, they all got settled down to
deconcentration with creation of
parastatals alongside. The simple
question before us now is how to reverse
this trend and get genuine LGIs
established which can promote citizen
participation and thereby provide better
governance and improved service delivery.
In my view, the first step is to improve
the image of the local tier of governance.
This can be done by stating it clearly in
the Constitution of the country.  (This took
over 40 years in India). A mandatory
provision in the Constitution is
sacrosanct, whereas an Ordinance/Act
may not have quite the same sanctity.
This provision must include regular and
periodic elections to LGIs; a broad
indication of powers and functions and
inter-governmental relationships; suitable
reservations to make local governance
inclusive and safeguards to ensure that
the LGIs do not become victims of high-
handedness of the Governments above.
Let us hope that the new Constitution of
Nepal will provide for these democratic
requirements.
This has to be supplemented by a
clear activity mapping specifically
indicating as to which LGI will do what.
This may vary from country to country
but a consensus among the governments
at different levels is possible. The
national/provincial governments will
have to provide as much untied grants as
possible so that the LGIs can decide their
own priorities in the decentralized
planning process which will be the key
activity of every LGI. Decentralization has
to become a peoples’ movement in all our
countries rather than a supply driven
government programme as it is at present.
We need to crate awareness among the
people to realize that power is never
given but has to be taken. Building the
capacities of elected representatives and
reorienting bureaucracy to the changing
needs will be necessary to make the
process of decentralization effective.
6. THE WAY FORWARD
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There is also a need to create an
environment where local initiative and
voluntarism can grow hand-in-hand
and to establish linkages which would
produce a new partnership between the
LGIs and the NGOs for progressive rural
development. NGOs can play an effective
role as catalysts to educate the people on
their rights and duties, organize them to
participate in development activities,
encourage them to take part in elections
as voters and candidates and help them
to act as watchdogs to prevent any misuse
or corrupt practice. They can also induce
or force functionaries to guarantee social
justice to the weaker sections.
Many of us have an unflinching
commitment to LGIs through whom, we
believe, a citizen can effectively participate
in governance. How do we translate this
into action? As Gandhiji once said the
best way to strengthen democracy is to
have more democracy. We need to invest
in building peoples’ Institutions for their
own development. Constitutional
amendments/Acts have taken the process
of democracy from the provinces to the
villages. Can we deepen it further? In my
view, the answer lies in our organizing,
supporting and strengthening school
betterment committees, water and
sanitation committees, self help groups,
joint forest management committees and
the like, which provide an immediate
forum for community participation at the
local level. No doubt the State and the
donors have already attempted this in
some of our countries. But the mistake
we have committed is that we have
allowed them to be parallel bodies,
without making any attempt to link them
to the LGIs, through the Gram Sabha or
Village council, the basic unit of local
governance. I visualize a village or a town
where groups of citizens look after their
specific areas of interest, meet periodically
in the Gram Sabha/Ward Sabha,
exchange ideas and help the local body
or make use of it, to discharge these
services efficiently.  That appears to be the
way if we want both community
participation and local governance to
succeed. Can we, the civil society
organizations, work towards this?
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